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Abstract
Ecological dumping is a catchword used in the public discussion on environmental
policies in open economies to characterize situations in which a country uses a too-lax environ-
mental legislation as an instrument of achieving trade-related economic policy goals. The paper
first tries to define ecological dumping and then looks at economic motives underlying this kind
of environmental policy. The approaches considered in this paper are the terms-of-trade
argument, strategic trade policy and a public choice model in which the government either
maximizes tax revenues or supports sector-specific interest groups.
1. Introduction
Environmental legislation provides a means to the government to influence the
competitiveness of an economy or of some of its sectors. According to the standard
theorems of international trade theory, a restrictive policy towards the users of environ-
mental resources will distract internationally mobile factors of production and, inside the
economy, cause factor movements from the pollution-intensive sectors of the economy to
the cleaner sectors. The comparative advantage of the former is diminished by such a
policy. Thus, environmental legislation affects ^he international division of labour and_.can_
be usedjto achieve ^f ade^rjolic^obje^ctives. This is particularly appealing if the appropriate
instruments, tariffs and quotas, are not available, for instance if the country has__signed
treaties that prohibit restrictions on imports from other countries. Examples are the EC
treaties and the GATT. Thus, the politician may be tempted to use the tools of environ-
mental policies to achieve objectives other than the internalization of the social_^osts_of
pollution. The main objectives are the improvement of the terms of trade, strategic trade-
policy considerations, and the protection of infant or ailing industries or sectors which are
supported by powerful lobbies.
Earlier versions of the paper have been presented in seminars at the Kiel Institute of
World Economics, the Universities of Munich and Konstanz, and during the 1992
European Research Workshop in International Trade held at the Universidade Nova
of Lisbon and I am indebted to the participants for helpful comments and suggestions.
Moreover, I have benefitted considerably from discussing problems of environmental
policies in open economies with Kym Anderson, Richard Blackhurst, Scott Barrett,
Carlo Carraro and Henry Tulkens. None of them is responsible for any deficiencies of
this paper.The protection of particular sectors or subgroups of a society by means of environ-
mental policies may result in an environmental legislation which is too lax in some sense.
Producers obtain hidden subsidies in terms of low pollution abatement requirements and
they can dump their products in international markets at prices that do not reflect the true
cost of production. This is considered to be a practice of unfair trade. Thus, the term
'ecological dumping
5 is often used in the public discussion to paraphrase the phenomenon.
This catchword will be taken up for the following investigation. It should be kept in mind,
however, that, in contrast to normal dumping, ecological dumping is an activity performed
by the government and not by an individual firm. Moreover, it does not in the first place
affect the price of a tradeable commodity but that of a factor of production which is inter-
„ nationally immobile: nature's capability to provide environmental resources.
This paper is an attempt to cast some more light on the issue of eco-dumping. In a
first step, a sensible definition of the subject is sought. Three possibilities to define eco-
dumping will be discussed and it will be seen that the definition corresponding to the
public-opinion view of ecological dumping is not very useful Thus, there remain two sens-
ible alternatives of defining the subject of the investigation. We shall then try to identify
economic motives underlying a government's decision to engage in ecological dumping. In
this scenario, environmental policy instruments are used not only to internalize the social
costs of pollution but also to influence the terms of trade.. Thus, there will be some similar-
ities with the literature on optimum tariffs. It will seen that environmental policy may
indeed serve as an instrument of trade poh'cy (an idea which is by no means new in econ-
omics), but it is generally not optimal to use it in a way which may be described as
ecological dumping. If eco-dumping is not optimal from an welfare-theoretical point of
view and if it, nevertheless, exists in the real world, how can it be explained? Some ideas of
where explanations should be sought will be presented in sections 5 and 6.
Finally, it may be useful to say what is missing in this paper. The theoretical frame-
work of the analysis is an international-trade model hi which the production of traded
commodities harms the environment. Of course, there are also environmental problems
connected with the consumption of these goods and they may have strong implications on
international trade (as the Danish bottle case hi the EC has vividly demonstrated). None-
theless, the issue will not be addressed in this paper in detail. Another omission is the neg-
lect of transfrontier pollution. It has been shown by Merrifield (1988) and Rauscher (1991),
that the combination of transfrontier pollution spill-overs and international trade create
interesting phenomena hi the standard model of international trade. But since this paper is
concerned with thejmpact of international trade on domestic environmental policies mere-
ly, transfrontier pollution would only complicate the analysis without providing additional
insights into the issue under consideration. Therefore, I shall deal with purely national
environmental problems. Moreover, I assume that, due to international trade agreements,restricting international trade is prohibited. Thus, there will be neither tariffs nor quotas
but only free international trade.
2. Three Definitions of Ecological Dumping
In the public opinion, the term 'ecological dumping' characterizes a situation in
which the environmeLcal standards in one country are lower than those in other countries.
By undercutting the environmental standards of other countries, a government reduces the
production costs of domestic finns._They can produce at lower costs than their foreign
competitors and this is considered to be unfair. As a consequence, a desirable world of fair
trade would be characterized by complete harmonization of^mdronmentalpolicies: _aU_
countries should use the same environmental standards. This view of ecological dumping
corresponds in a sense to the traditional definition of dumping in commodity markets. It is
an activity which violates the law of one price. Commodities are sold at lower prices in for-
eign than in domestic markets. See Viner (1923). In the case of eco-dumping, it is not the
price of the final good but that of a factor of production which differs between countries.
There are two objections against applying this concept to international differences
in environmental regulations. First, if one believes in factor price equalization, the implicit
prices of environmental resources should be the same in all countries if there is trade. To
detect eco-dumping activities, one would have to employ the autarky prices. The second
critique is more important. To a trade theorist, it does not make much sense to postulate
that all countries should use the same level of environmental regulation. International diff-
erences in the endowments with environmental resources do exist, be it because of differ-
ences in physical characteristics of the countries, be it due to differences in the tastes of the
people. Removing these differences by means of harmonization is equivalent to removing a
part of the, basis ^gainsj^jnjb[ade. See Hansson (1990) for instance. Thus, ecological
dumping by employing lower environmental standards than the rest of the world can be a
good thing and there is no need to rack one's brains about it as a problem.
Nonetheless, I think that ecological dumping is a problem. With another definition
of the subject, this becomes obvious at once. The definition is related to the modern view of
dumping in commodity markets which defines the subject of its analysis as pricing at less
than marginal cost. See Davies/McGuinness (1982) and Ethier (1982). Correspondingly,
eco-dumping can be defined as pricing the activities that affect tiie environment at less than
the marginal social cost _of environmental degradation. Or more generally, ecological
dumping occurs when, due to international trade, a country's government does not fully
internalize domestic environmental externaUties._It is now obvious that eco-dumping is aproblem which deserves investigation into its origins and into the appropriate policy
measures to cope with it.
However, useful as it may be for the academic researcher, the definition is still not
very helpful in real-world applications. There are many reasons for too low a level of envir-
onmental regulation. Among these, trade-related motives are only_on_e_aspect As a way out
of this dilemma, one may compare the sectors producing tradeable and non-tradeable
goods. The hypothesis is that trade-related measures of environmental policy are primarily
targeted at the sectors of the economy that produce traded goods, i.e. the import-compet-
ing and the export sectors. This implies a third definition of eco-dumping. Eco-dumping
occurs whenever the (explicit or implicit) price of environmental resources is lower in the
tradeables than in the non-tradeables sector. A prerequisite for this to hold is that the gov-
ernment has the power to use sector-specific instruments of environmental policy. Anec-
dotal evidence tells is that this is indeed the case. There are even plant-specific differences
JnjgoUution abatement requirements, as is vividly testified by the electricity generation
sectors in various countries.
Given that the public opinion view does not provide a sensible defintion of eco-
dumping, there remain two approaches to the subject of investigation. The major difference
between the two definitions of ecological dumping is their point of reference. In the first
case, it is the full internalization of the social costs of pollution. In the second case, it is the
policy applied to the non-tradeables sector, which is not subject to international compet-
ition in the world market.
3. The Model
Ecological dumping will be analysed in a two-factors, three-goods model of an
open economy. In order to reduce complexity, I assume that only two goods are produced
domestically. Sector 1 of the economy produces non-tradeable goods and sector 2 produces
the export good. There is no import-competing sector since commodity 3 is produced only
in the foreign country.
2 The two factors of production are capital and an environmental
resource, which will also be referred to as 'emissions'. Let K* be the capital stock and E
l be
the quantity of the environmental resource employed in the /th sector. The output of this
sector, Q', then is
(1) Q
l
A similar model with traded and non-traded goods has been analysed by Jones (1974).
In his model, however, the exported good is not consumed in the home country.The production functions are assumed to be well-behaved. They are concave and exhibit
constant returns to scale. The partial derivatives are positive. The second derivatives F'KK
and F
iEE are negative and the cross derivatives F
iKB are positive. This implies that capital
and emissions are imperfect substitutes or, more technically speaking, that their elasticity of
substitution is finite and has the normal sign.
3
Let P and P
3 be the prices of commodities 2 and 3 in terms of the non-traded
good which serves as the numeraire. P=P IP
3 denotes the country's terms of trade, i.e. the
price of the export good in terms of the import good. Moreover, let C' denote the domestic
consumption and let m(P) be the foreign country's excess demand function for commodity
2 An equilibrium requires that the excess supply of the home country equals the excess
demand of the foreign country:
(2) Q
2-C* = m(P).




or, together with (2),
(3b) C
3 = Pm(P).
The demand for commodities 1, 2, and 3 and the optimal environmental policy can
be derived from the national welfare function W(.,.,.,.) which has as its arguments the con-
sumption of the three goods and environmental quality, A. For the sake of simplicity, I
assume that the welfare function is additively separable in its arguments.
4 Therefore,




with positive but decreasing partial derivatives.
Algebraically, the condition f^g > 0 follows from constant returns to scale and
fpp < 0 or fKK < 0.
Even with this restrictive assumption, there will be a large variety of feasible results and
a more general welfare function would not add much to the analysis in this respect.
This type of welfare functions is known from models with endogenous factor supply.
See Kemp/Jones (1962).There is a fixed capital stock, K, which can be moved without costs between
sectors 1 and 2:
(5) K = K
1 + K
2.
For reasons of comparability, let us assume that all sectors discharge the same
pollutant. Then, the environmental quality may be defined as
(6) A = -E*-E
2.
Inserting eqs. (1), (2), (3b), (5) and (6) into the welfare function yields
(7) W= U^F^KW)] + ^[^(K-K^-A-E^-mfP)] + U
3[Pm(P)J + V[A].
This is to be maximized by employing the appropriate environmental policy. If the country
is large, it is able to affect its terms of trade, P. In the small-country case, P is given and the
excess demand of the rest of the world is perfectly elastic. This case will be considered first.
The government chooses the optimal state of the environment,^. The firms decide
on the allocation of capital to the producing sectors of the economy. The emission levels E
and E can be chosen either by the producers or by the government. In one case, the
government chooses just the level of environmental policy and then leaves it to the
producers to allocate the emissions. This can be done by chosing appropriate emission
taxes or by using a tradeable permit scheme. On the other hand, the government itself may
wish to determine the emissions of the two producing sectors. The optimal level of environ-
mental quality, A> is determined by
(8) U
2c^E = V
where primes and subscripts denote (partial) derivatives of functions. Under the
assumption of perfect competition, factors are remunerated according to their marginal
productivity. If the government left the allocation decision to the producers, the equil-







If the government itself decides on the allocation issue, it maximizes (7) also with respect to
E
1, which implies
(10) U'cF^ = U'cF










This implies that the results of economy-wide and sector-specific environmental
regulation are the same. The same tax rate will be applied to all sectors. Thus, it does not
pay to discriminate one sector and favour another if the country under consideration is
small. Moreover, the emission tax rate covers the marginal social cost of environmental
degradation. Thus, there is no ecological dumping, independently of the definition applied.
4. The Terms-of-Trade Argument
Matters may be different if the country under consideration is large. It has an




Noting that due to utility maximization of the households U
2C = PL
r c, this can be re-
written
(11) dW = U
3cmdP.
As an exporter of good 2, the country will benefit from an increase in the relative price of
this good compared to the-imported good. One can now determine the impact of the
supply of the environmental factor of production on the terms of trade.
In a first step, we shall deal with a scenario in which the government determines
merely the level of environmental quality and then imposes a tradeable-permits scheme or
levies an emission tax, which the firms use to decide on the allocation of the environmental
factor of production to the two producing sectors of the economy. For the standard model
without non-tradeable goods, the optimal environmental policy has been investigated by
Markusen (1975) and Rauscher (1991a,b). A country should use its public policy to in-
crease the relative price of the factor it is relatively well-endowed with to improve its terms
of trade. The reduction of the availability of this factor tends to increase its price and/if the
country is/ the relative price of the commodity that uses this factor intensively in its prod-
uction. Since this good is the export good, the terms of trade are improved by such a policy.
Applying this to a model with environmental resources yields the result that a country well-
endowed with environmental resources should employ a particularly restrictive policy
towards users of environmental policy. In contrast, countries not so well endowed withenvironmental resources should reduce their emission tax rates in order to increase the
relative prices of the other factors of production.
Matters are different in a case of complete specialization, i.e. if there is no
domestic consumption of the imported good. Under normal parameter constellations, it is
optimal to reduce the supply of the export good in order to raise its price. This can be done
by reducing the supply of the environmental factor of production - regardless of whether
the country is well-endowed with resources or not. In the model considered here, there is
an additional complication since there is the non-traded goods sector which itself uses
environmental resources. The impact of a change in the environmental policy A on the
terms of trade, P, is determined by by.




(12c) F\ - P
2F
2K = 0.
(12d) F^ - P
2F
2E = 0. :
Eqs. (12a,b) are derived from utility maximization by concsumers whereas (12c,d) follows
from profit-maximizing behaviour of firms. Eliminating P^ yields
(13a) U
2C-PU
3C = 0. d
(13b) U'c^K - tfc^K = 0.
 y
(13c) u'cF^ - V
2CF
2E = 0. 4
Total differentiation with respect to P, K
1, E
1 and>l gives the desired result. Some basic but
cumbersome algebraic exercises show that the sign of dP/dA is ambiguous: there are nine
positive and two negative terms.
6 This is due to the fact that both sectors compete for the environmental factor of
production. A reduction of the availability of these resources reduces the marginal
An additional ambiguity arises when the determinant of the matrix of the partial
derivatives of (13a,b,c) with respect to P, E
1 and E
2 has the "wrong" sign. An
explanation of this will be given below.productivity of capital in both sectors since since F
lKE > 0. If this reduction is larger in the
non-tradeables than in the tradeables sector, capital will be moved from the non-tradeables
to the tradeables sector of the economy. Thus, the output of traded goods may actually rise
if the reduction of emissions is dominated by an increase in the capital stock. As a
consequence, the terms of trade may be reduced. Under certain circumstances, it may be
advisable to relax environmental regulations to improve the terms of trade. It is not optimal
to fully internalize the domestic costs of environmental disruption and this may be called
ecological dumping. If, however, the direct effects of environmental policy changes
dominate the indirect general-eqiiilibrium effects, it is advisable to use more-restrictive
policies.
The type of environmental policy considered here uses one instrument to cope
with two distorsions. There are the social costs of environmental degradation and the
potential to improve the terms of trade. In this case, two policy instruments are better than
one. Of course, the optimal combination of policy measures would be an emission tax plus
a tariff. However, if tariffs are not available as an instrument of economic policy, the
government may wish to enlarge its set of policy measures by imposing sector-specific
environmental policies. The question to be considered here is whether such a policy tends
to discriminate against the sectors producing non-traded goods. For this purpose, it is
convenient to rewrite the objective function by substituting for .4:









(13b) U^F^ - U
2CF
2K = 0.
Using (13a,b), one can derive the welfare effects of changes in sector-specific
environmental policies. Optimal policies are characterized by:
(14a) dW/dE
1 = U^F





2 = UC^E-V + Uc
3rn(dPldE
2) = 0..
Noting that in a competitive economy the marginal productivities of emissions equal the









2E, one can easily10
determine a condition for eco-dumping defined in the sense of discrimination of non-
traded goods production. Eco-dumping according to this defininition when the emission tax





1 ]M' < .
dE
1 dE'
Eco-dumping is optimal if the terms-of-trade effect of additional emissions in the non-
tradeables sector is smaller than the corresponding effect in the sector producing traded
commodities. If this condition holds, the improvement in the terms of trade by an add-
itional unit of emissions in the tradeables sector exceeds the improvement achieved by in-
creasing emissions in the non-tradeables sector. Therefore, it is optimal to apply lower
environmental standards to the exporting industries.
The terms-of-trade effects of sector-specific environmental policies can be determ-
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The sign of the determinant, D, of the matrix on the left-hand side is ambiguous. This is due
to the terms ocurring in its first-row first-column element. If the foreign country's import
demand is inelastic, then m' is close to zero, implying that this element may be positive . In
this case, the determinant is negative. But the opposite scenario is also feasible. In order to
give an economic interpretation, imagine a situation in which the supply of good 3 is in-
creased exogenously, e.g. by some manna from heaven. The intuition is that this should im-
prove the terms of trade, since the scarcity of the import good is reduced and it gets
cheaper. It can be shown that this happens only if the determinant is positive.
7 If the det-
7 Let M be the quantity of manna falling from heaven. Then
dP
dM
It follows tha.tsign(dP/dM) = sign(D).11
erminant is negative, general-equilibrium interdependencies produce the counter-intuitive
result of declining terms of trade. In what follows, I will assume that the intuition is correct
and that the determinant has a positive sign.
The terms-of-trade effects of sector-specific environmental policies can be







The terms-of-trade effect of an increase in emissions is negative in the traded commodities
sector and ambiguous in the non-tradeables sector. This can be explained as follows. An
increase in the availability of environmental resources in sector 2 increases the supply of ex-
portable goods and, under normal circumstances, their price will decline. For sector 1,
which produces the non-traded good, there are two opposing effects. On the one hand, an
increase in emissions increases the marginal productivity of capital since F %£ > 0. If
commodity prices are given, capital is moved from sector 2 to sector 1. This reduces the
supply of the export good and tends to improve the terms of trade. On the other hand, the
increase in the availability of the environmental factor of production in the non-tradeables
sector increases the supply of this good. Its price relative to that of the other good which is
produced at home is reduced. For given productivities, capital tends to move from sector 1
to sector 2, this raises the supply of the exported good and leads to a deterioration of the
terms of trade.
Given the terms-of-trade effects of sector-specific environmental policies, the
policy implications can easily be derived. Since under normal circumstances the terms-of-
trade effect of additional emissions in the export sector is negative, one should attempt to
reduce these emissions below those of the reference scenario in which the terms-of-trade
effects are not taken into account. The policy implication for the non-tradeables sector is
ambiguous. If capital and emissions are good substitutes in this sectors (if F KJ? is large),
then there is a positive terms-of-trade effect, and the environmental policy measures
applied to the non-tradeables sector should be relaxed. In this scenario the policy implic-
ation is the opposite of eco-dumping: discriminate the sector which produces traded goods.
It should be noted, however, that a number of different scenarios are imaginable some of
which can indeed result in the discrimination of the non-tradeables sector. But such an out-
come is not particularly likely.12
We can summarize that there is a tendency towards stricter environmental legis-
lation, either in the export sector or for the economy as a whole, if policy makers wish to
improve the terms of trade. Due to general-equilibrium considerations, however, the
opposite policy recommendation is also possible for some parameter combinations. It
should be noted that the tendency towards better protection of the environment is an arti-
fact of the assumptions used in this model. The crucial asumption is the absence of an
import-competing industry. If such a sector existed, the policy recommendation would
mainly depend upon whether the economy is well-endowed with environmental resources
or not.
/ 5. Strategic Trade Policy
In the previous sections, it has been assumed that perfect competition prevails on
factors and goods markets. Over the last decade, numerous models have been developed
which differ from the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework in this respect and
allow to derive interesting policy implications. One of them is the strategic trade policy
framework which shows that, under certain circumstances, it may be advisable to subsidize
domestic firms in order to increase their market power in international markets.
The basic model is that of Brander/Spencer (1985). They show that the govern-
ment can turn a firm playing Nash-Cournot into a Stackelberg leader by subsidizing its
production. Rents are shifted into the home country and this is welfare-improving. Direct
subsidies, however, can easily be detected by foreign competitors. Therefore, it may be
•. better to use indirect methods of subsidization. One possibility is to subsidize domestic
research and development. See Spencer/Brander (1983). Another alternative is to impose
relatively modest pollution abatement requirements on the firms competing in international
oligopoly markets. There have been some recent attempts to analyse this possibility in
theoretical models. See Barrett (1991), Conrad (1991) and Ulph (1992). I will refer mainly
to Barrett's paper and try to apply his results to the general-equilibrium framework used
above.
Barrett (1991) uses the standard model of strategic trade policy extended by the
introduction of costly pollution abatement. There are two firms, one domestic and one
foreign. They sell their production in a third country. Each firm takes as given the quantity
supplied by the other firm and the environmental policy of its home government. In this
situation, the market solution is the Nash equilibrium which is represented by point N in
Figure 1. Q and q denote the quantities supplied by the domestic and the foreign firm,
respectively, and R and r are their reaction curves. Let B and b be the iso-profit curves of
the two firms. If a direct subsidy is given to the domestic firm, it increases its output. TheDiDiiorneK
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equilibrium moves along the foreign country's reaction curve. This is beneficial to the home
country as long as the net profits (profits minus subsidies) of the domestic industry
increase. The optimum is given by point S, where the foreign firm's reaction curve touches
the best-possible domestic iso-profit curve. This is the Stackelberg solution.
Figure 1
Matters are slightly different if the subsidy is given indirectlyby relaxingenvirQ&:
mental standards. This kind of subsidy is not merely a purely redistributive policy instru-
ment but its application incurs some real cost. The environmental quality is deteriorated
and this has to be taken into account by the government. The emission tax rate should be
chosen such that the marginal social cost due to environmental degradation and the marg-
inal benefit from the increase in the market position of domestic firm are equated. The
optimal solution is to be found somewhere between the Nash and the Stackelberg points N
and S.
Applying these results to the eco-dumping problem yields the following propos-
itions. It can be optimal to favour the export industries if the supply side of the inter-
national market is oligoplistic. This implies that the non-tradeables sector is discriminated.
Moreover, the environmental standards are lower than those that internalize the pure social /14
cost of pollution. Therefore, eco-dumping according to both our defmtions may be ex-
plained by strategic trade policy considerations. Finally, there may be an international
competition in environmental regulations which leads to undesirably low levels of environ-
mental quality in many countries.
Matters can be rather different if the general-equilibrium effects are taken into
account, &s can be seen in Figure 1, the objective of strategic trade policy is to raise the
production of the domestic export industry for any given quantity supplied by the foreign
competitor^ In a partial equilibrium, this is achieved by increasing the supply of the
environmental factor of production for this sector. In a general equilibrium, the change in
the allocation of capital must also be taken into account. We will look at a situation in
which the government chooses sector-specific environmental policy measures. Let us, for
the rest of this part oirthVpajter^ use the assumption often employed in the strategic trade
literature that the good is not sold on the domestic market, i.e.
(18) m(P) =
Let m(P) now be the inverse demand function faced by the domestic oligopolist for a given
level of production of its foreign competitor. If this firm acts as a price taker on domestic
factor markets, its profits are passed over to the factor owners. The factors are rmunerated
at more than marginal cost. This implies
(19)
2K = (l + e)P
2F
2K.
where e = ml(m'P) , -1< e < 0 , is the elasticity of the residual demand function which will
be assumed to be constant. Noting that r=P^P andP U c = U c, we obtain
(19') U^K -(1 + e) U
3CP F
2K = 0 .






















It can be shown that the determninant of the matrix on the left-hand side is
positive since the world market demand for good 2 is elastic. The impact of changes in
environmental policy on the allocation of capital turns out to be
dK
1





















In both cases, the effects of environmental policy changes are ambiguous. An increase in
emissions in a sector makes capital more productive at the margin since F ^g and -r £g are
positive. Thus, a policy which increases emissions in a sector attracts capital. On the other
hand, a good produced in a more pollution-intensive process becomes cheaper and the
marginal value product of capital tends to be reduced. This induces a capital movement
into the opposite direction. In the case of a change in E , however, this capital removal due
to price changes is always dominated by the direct output expansion effect of the increase
in emissions. Thus, in order to increase the output of the export industry, it is advisable to
relax the sector-specific environmental policy. But it may be optimal to relax the policy for
the other sector even more if this induces a very massive capital flow to the export sector.
Although this is not particularly likely, it may be optimal to use an environmental policy
which is the opposite of ecological dumping.
Matters become more complicated algebraically, if an economy-wide policy is
sought which increases the output of the export industry. An additional equation for the
cross-sector equalization of emission taxes has to be introduced and the effect of a change
in environmental policy on the allocation of emissions to the two sectors has to be consid-
ered too. The result is ambiguous: at least one of the two sectors will raise its output if
pollution abatement requirements are reduced. It may, however, happen that factors move
to the non-tradeables sector of the economy. In this case, the output of the export industry
may be reduced by ecological dumping.
Summarizing the results of this part of the paper, we can conclude that strategic
behaviour in international trade does not necessarily lead to eco-dumping, independently of
the definition applied. As an additional caveat, one should note that, as Eaton/Grossman







(1986) have shown, the policy implications are turned into the opposite direction when the
oligopolists play Bertrand instead of Cournot.
6. Towards a Public Choice Explanation of Environmental Policies in Open Economies
In the previous sections environmental policies have been investigated which
maximize an index of national well-being. It is a commonplace thing, however, that real-
world political decision makers do not use this kind of welfare criteria. Instead, they try to
follow their own objectives. In what follows, I shall consider two models that in which these
objectives are taken into account. The first one looks at some of the intrinsic driving forces
of a public bureaucracy, the second approach considers the impact of the power of sector-
specific interest groups on governmental decisions. In order to make matter simpler and to
seperate the effects from the terms-of-trade effects, we shall consider a small economy for
which the world market prices are given.
According to Niskanen (1977) and others, one major characteristic of a govern-
mental bureaucracy is the desire to maximize the budget it has to administer. Taking this
into account, the objective function has to be rewritten. Assume that the policy maker
maximizes a weighted average of a measure of national welfare and the benefits from tax
revenues. Let the benefits from tax revenues be measured by an increasing and strictly con-
cave function G(.). The new objective function turns out to be
(22) W° = W+ Gi^E
1 + T^E
2)
where Wis given by eqs. (7) or (7').
If 7" — i , both sectors face identical environmental regulations. In order to detect
eco-dumping, one should compare the solution of the maximization of W^ with a policy
which maximizes national welfare. There are two effects of a change in the emission tax
rate on the tax revenue. First, for given emissions, the revenue will increase by (E
1+E
2)
times the change in the tax rate. But with an increasing tax rate, emissions should be
reduced which implies that, for given levels of the tax rate, the revenue is reduced. Either of
these effects may domininate or there may be a bell-shaped Laffer curve. Depending on
whether the revenue function is an increasing or decreasing function in the social optimum,
the policy maker may wish to raise or reduce the tax rate. Of course, similar arguments
apply to a situation in which the government chooses sector-specific environmental policies
and it is not clear which sector is discriminated in an optimum.
A more promising approach to identifying motives of ecological dumping is the
consideration of sector-specific interest groups. In a representative democracy, the voter17
does not decide directly upon all the relevant issues but merely elects a government which
she hopes to represent her will. The government has some discretion in interpreting the will
of the electorate. Due to this discretion, interest groups have a chance to influence the
government's decisions by lobbying, which may range from spending resources on public-
relation and financial support of campaigns to bribing and blackmailing. There are good
arguments in favour of the hypothesis that the traded-goods industries (cars, chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals, etc.) have a stronger impact on the government than the producers of
non-traded goods (mainly services). If this is true, then the policy maker's objective
function is changed by the impact of lobbying.
In what follows, it will be assumed that the lobbyists are concerned about the
output of the export industry. This is a sensible approach if there are structural problems
with a threat of unemployment and declining profits or if there are sector-specific factors
that experience income increases when the output of the sector is increased. If the lobby's
impact on political decisions is sufficiently large, the government will maximize an objective
function which is a weighted average of the national welfare function and the utility




where L(.) is increasing and strictly concave and Wis defined by eq. (7').
To get an idea of what the major impacts are, the impact of a change in environ-
mental policies on the government's objective function can be determined. In a first step, it
is necessary to consider the impacts of the environmental policy on the allocation of the
factors of production. This can be done by total differentiation of the first-order optimality
conditions of the households and firms:




 u2C^E = 0."
Total differentiation with respect to K
1, E
1 and A shows that the impact of a change in
environmental policy, A, on the allocation of factors is ambiguous. In the case of capital this
may have been expected. But the same is true for emissions: although the overall level of
emsisions is increased by a relaxation of environmental policy, emissions in one of the two
sectors may be reduced. The impact on production is also ambiguous. Ecological dumping
may result either in an increase or a reduction of the export industry's output.
Matters are a bit simpler if we consider sector-specific environmental policies. The
first-order optimality condition18
(13b) U'CF'K - U'CF'K = 0
has to be differentiated with respect to K, E
1 and E . This yields
dK




(24a) — = -— — -—
(24b) — =
An increase in emissions in sector 1 moves capital into this sector if F ^ is large, i.e. if
there is a substantial increase in capital productivity, or if -U cc is small. The latter
condition means that the price elasticity of demand is large and this implies that an in-
crease in supply results only in a small price reduction. Thus the increase in E has only a
small effect on the marginal value product of capital for a given level of the physical
productivity. The same arguments apply for the other sector of the economy.















Starting from a situation of a social optimum in which dW/dE =dW/dE =0,





















It is the last term in the numerator in eq. (27) which may exhibit the "wrong" sign.
Thus it is possible than the export industry is supported best by applying more-restrictive
environmental policies there that in the non-tradeables industry. This is just the opposite of
ecological dumping if it is defined as discrimination against non-tradeables producers.19
However, this result is not very likely and, under normal parameter constellations, it is
advisable to apply lower levels of environmental regulation in the export industry than in
the non-traded goods sector.
Summarizing the results of the models presented in this section, one arrives at the
conclusion that it is by no means clear that it is in the interest of the exporters' lobby or the
government itself to have eco-dumping as an environmental policy.
7. Summary and Conclusions
The preceeding investigation has been an attempt to give more economic content
to the catchword of eco-dumping, which has has frequently been (mis) used in the recent
public discussion on environmental policies in open economies. In a first step a definition
of eco-dumping has been sought. There are two sensible definitions. One of them uses the
optimal internalization of social costs as its point of reference, the second one is based on
the comparison of regulations applied to sectors producing traded and non-traded
commodities. A third definition based on an international comparison of environmental
policies has been rejected. We have then tried to find the economic motives of eco-
dumping. Under which circumstances is it optimal to employ a policy which may be termed
'eco-dumping' according to one of the two criteria? It has been seen that neither terms-of-
trade considerations nor maximization of the revenues from emission taxation explain eco-
dumping. Depending on parameters of the demand and supply side, these objectives may
be achieved sometimes by ecological dumping and sometimes by its converse. Strategic
trade policy and lobbying activities of the exporters are more successful in explaining
ecological dumping. However, there are still a number of ambiguities and the general
equilibrium repercussions of changes in environmental policy may turn the results around.
Lobbyists would sometimes be surprised if they knew that relaxing environmental standards
can make the exporters worse off.
Applied to the real world, the interest group approach is the most promising
among different candidates for an explanation of ecological dumping. If an explanation of
economic policy decisions is sought, it is not important what is optimal but what is thought
One can see from eqs. (24b) and (25b) that an increase in emissions in the export
industry will always raise its output. At least in this model framework, a situation in
which exporters benefit from more rigid environmental policies in their own sector is
not possible. This may, however, change if more complicated versions of the model are
considered, e.g. if the country is large and if more general utility functions are
introduced.20
to be optimal. It is a truism (but not always the trutti) that a producer will benefit from
relaxed pollution abatement requirements applied to the production processes she uses.
But this conjecture, wrong as it may be, provides incentives to lobby for lower emission tax
rates. If the exporters' lobbies are more influential than other lobbies, then this may explain
ecological dumping. The model presented here has used a shortcut to translate the interest
of lobbyists into political decisions. A complicated political process has been modelled by
simply adding some terms to the government's objective function. It is desirable to model
this process more explicitly. A promising approach is due to Hillman/Ursprung (1991) who
model the impact of interest groups with motives related to emissions, pollution and the
environment on international trade. If a similar analysis could be undertaken for the opp-
osite problem of how trade-related interests affect environmental policies, this would be
another major step towards an understanding of the driving forces of ecological dumping.
Another problem which has been neglected in the preceding analysis is that of
retaliation. What happens, if the other country also uses environmental policy measures to
improve its terms of trade or to support its export industries? It is likely that there will be
prisoners' dilemma situations in which both countries would be better off by cooperating.
The consequences of non-cooperative behavior on the environment are, however, less clear
and this is another problem area where future research is desirable.
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